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  Foodborne disease outbreaks have a tremendous impact on society, including 
foodborne illnesses, hospitalizations, lost work time, and deaths. These food-safety 
events have a significant influence in shaping consumer’s perception of risk. In food 
consumption, outbreaks of foodborne illnesses also have an effect on the development of 
public health policy. Due to these safety-related uncertainties in the food supply chain, 
various regulatory safety and health policies are implemented to decrease potential harm 
to likely victims. The expected effect of these food-safety policies forecasted in terms of 
reduction in foodborne illnesses, mortality, and food-related diseases may be overstated if 
consumer’s offsetting behavior is overlooked. Reduction and in some cases reversal of 
direct policy effect may occur. This research tests the presence of dominant or partial 
offsetting behavior in the preparation and consumption of vegetables if a food-safety 
policy such as the Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 






























Offsetting Behavior and the Benefits of Food Safety Policies in 
Vegetable Preparation and Consumption 
 





Food-safety related worries occur at all levels of the food supply chain: on-farm, 
in transportation systems, and in the course of handling. These food-safety related 
uncertainties are responsible for numerous food recalls (USDA, FSIS, 2001). For this 
reason, many regulatory, safety, and health policies are adopted to reduce harm to likely 
victims from accidents and other harmful events. Some regulatory economic studies (e.g., 
Peltzman, 1975; Hause, 2006; Blomquist, 1988) have observed that reductions, and in 
some cases, even reversal of direct policy effects on expected harm may occur in the face 
of articulated policy because of decreased care by potential victims. This increase in 
expected harm attributed to decreased care by victims in response to the implemented 
policies is what has been termed offsetting behavior (OB). If the effect of OB is 
overlooked, the expected outcome of food-safety policy implementation will be 
misleading.  
 
Extensive studies have been carried out to show the existence of OB and its 
preponderance in the automobile sector (e.g., Lave and Weber, 1970; Peltzman, 1975); 
workplace and consumer product accidents (Viscusi, 1985); effect of health on the way of 
life-dependent disorders and death (Wilde, 1994); and the effect of medical innovations 
(Peltzman, 2001). OB has been found to exist in food consumption as well. Nganje et al. 
(2007) and Miljkovic et al. (2008) found out that OB exists in food-safety. In their 
findings, they discovered that despite the mandatory and widespread implementation of 
the Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (PR/HACCP) in the 
meat sector, the numbers of outbreaks in the meat sector are on the increase.  
 
The specific objectives of this study are threefold. First we examine the 
relationship between food-safety associated risk tolerance and consumer’s perception of 
risk. Second, we model and evaluate the impact of both positive and negative information 
on consumer’s perception of risk. This involves measuring how consumers react to new 
information on the safety of the vegetables they consume. This will then be employed to 
assess the presence or absence of OB in the preparation and consumption of vegetables. 
Third, we provide guidelines and scope for policy makers to take into account OB where 
it is significant, such that predicted food-safety policy effects can be more accurately 
stated. 
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To carry out these objectives, risk tolerance indexes were developed using factor 
analysis, and then these indexes were used to model the impact of information on 
consumer’s perception of risk, handling, and preparation of vegetables if a food-safety 
policy such as PR/HACCP is implemented in the sector. The emphasis is on how positive 
and negative information affect consumer’s perception of risk, handling, and preparation 
practices. The tested hypothesis is that imposing a food-safety measure (PR/HACCP) 
does not change consumer’s perception in such a manner that they become less cautious 
about how they prepare and consume their vegetables. Apart from the health benefits 
associated with regular consumption of vegetables, for at least two additional reasons, 
vegetables present certain qualities that make it suitable for this type of evaluation. 
Vegetables are consumed in a minimally processed (raw) form and are responsible for an 
increasing number of outbreaks. 
 
Food-Safety Policy, Recalls, and Outbreaks in the Vegetable Sector 
 
Though the Federal Government has a long record of regulation of food quality 
and safety, there has been a movement towards increased regulation possibly due to 
sporadic outbreaks (Caswell, 1988). Food-safety policy is based on a combination of 
voluntary measures undertaken by producers and regulatory measures imposed by 
government (Segerson, 1999).  
 
Food recalls play a significant role in ensuring food-safety. Recalls involve the 
removal of a food substance from circulation by a firm involved when it is believed the 
product presents a threat to consumers (Title 21 CFR 7.3 (g). Outbreaks of foodborne 
disease have an important influence on the development of public health policy (Palmer 
et al., 2000). Outbreaks of foodborne illnesses have increased fears about the 
effectiveness of protective measures designed for food-safety assurance (Antle, 1995). In 
1998, due to an increase in the reported number of outbreaks of foodborne illnesses 
associated with both domestic and imported fresh fruits and vegetables, the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Center for Food safety and Applied Nutrition 
(CFSAN) of the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) published a document entitled 
“Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables” 
(FDA, CFSAN, 1998). This guide was meant to support a continuing effort to develop 
national guidelines for the safety of fruits and vegetables by emphasizing the need to 
address safety hazards and good agricultural practices. The non-mandatory nature of food 
safety policy has been blamed for the increasing outbreaks witnessed in the fruit and 
vegetable sector (Krauter, 2007). 
 
Similarly, following repeated discoveries of E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella in 
the U.S food supply chain (Antle, 2000), the U.S Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and the Food Safety Inspection Service introduced new mandatory food-safety 
regulations (FDA, FSIS, 1996). This new regulation, PR/HACCP, was to ensure the 
safety of meat and poultry products by mandating the set up of critical control points 
(CCPs) in food production and processing operations. This would ensure regular testing 
for potentially dangerous products.  
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Despite the reduction in the level of most pathogens, the number of outbreaks in 
retail facilities increased (CDC, 2006). In the vegetable sector there has been a significant 
increase in the number of nationwide outbreaks leading to recalls of varying magnitude. 
The 2003 green onion hepatitis A outbreak that originated in Mexico, and the 2006 
spinach and lettuce E. coli O157: H7 and Salmonella nationwide outbreaks (Onyango et 
al., 2007) are recent examples. This general increase in outbreaks with lower pathogen 
prevalence suggests a possibility of the presence of OB. The studies carried out by 
Nganje et al. (2007) and Miljkovic et al. (2008) where OB was found to exist in food-
safety, this study aims to carry out similar evaluations, given certain observations in the 
vegetable sector assess if OB is present in the preparation and consumption of vegetables. 
This evaluation will be carried out under the assumption that a policy such as PR/HACCP 
is implemented in the vegetable sector. Fig 1.1 presents the general trend in foodborne 
disease outbreaks from 1983 to 2004. The trend in the diagram coincided with the 1996 
establishment of PR/HACCP in the meat and poultry sectors and the 1998 publication of 
the “Guide to Minimize Microbial Safety Hazards for Fruits and Vegetables” in the fruit 




Figure 1.1: Trends: Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System. 
Source: CDC (1983-2004). 
 
 
More than 200 known diseases are transmitted through foodborne illnesses 
including viruses, bacteria, parasites, toxins and metals (Bryan, 1982). These foodborne 
illnesses represent a significant burden on the U.S. population and health system as a 
whole, causing approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations and 5,000 
deaths annually (Kennedy et al., 1999). The annual costs associated with illnesses and 




Benefits and Costs of Food-Safety Regulation 
 
Presumably, the impact of OB is plausible and sometimes significant when 
policies are put in place to reduce harm to potential victims. Putting policies in place 
entails expenditures and expected benefits, hence appraisal of the costs and benefits of 
food safety policies is necessary. Arrow et al. (1996) proposed that interventions should 
be undertaken only if they are designed to produce over all positive net benefits. 
Following increasing pressure to sustain consumer’s trust, regulatory structures and 
government authorities are confronted with new and ongoing food-safety challenges 
(Henson and Caswell, 1999). Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), which is based on 
benefit-cost analysis, is becoming a primary part of the U.S. government policy structure 
process (Antle, 2000). U.S policy requires RIA of all policies with likely influence of at 
least $100 million (Morall, 1997). 
 
Benefits of Food-Safety Regulation 
 
Antle (1999) pointed that the eventual benefit of improved food-safety regulations 
is a reduction in the likelihood of illnesses and deaths associated with the consumption of 
food contaminated with microbial pathogens and related hazards. Superior food quality 
would sustain consumer health and provide  restoration in the face of injury (van 
Ravenswaay, 1995). Due to the diversity of quality of food product attributes and the non 
existence of market for benefits to be evaluated, a series of approaches exists to value the 
benefits of improved food-safety (Caswell, 1998). The lack of information related to food 
attributes makes the evaluation even more complex (Kinsey, 1993).  
 
Contingent valuation and experimental market models have been used to derive 
expressions of willingness to pay (WTP) (Brown et al., 2005), averting behavior cost 
(Eom, 1995), resource expenditures of medical costs and labor productivity for reduced 
risk morbidity and mortality (Roberts, 1991) or the cost of illness approach (COI) 
(Kenkel, 1994). Evaluating the increased entry to foreign markets is an increasingly used 
method for evaluating the benefits of food-safety regulations (Roberts and DeRemer, 
1997). 
 
Costs of Food-Safety Regulation 
 
Given market incentives to improve food-safety, firms will possibly implement 
hazard control measures in an effort to achieve strategic benefits (Stigler, 1971) in 
perspective of further severe regulations (Segerson, 1999). The combination of both 
public and private motivations to enhance food-safety, coupled with the response of 
industry in regards to regulation, complicates the estimation of the cost of food-safety 
regulation (Unnevehr and Jensen, 2001). From a general perspective, the cost of food-
safety regulation may include a blend of associated administrative costs, quality 
guarantee plans undertaken voluntarily, and government mandated regulatory standards 





Using an accounting approach, the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) 
estimated that the four years execution costs of PR/HACCP in the meat and poultry 
sector stand between $305 and $357 million (FSIS, 1996). Jensen and Unnevehr (1999) 
applied an economic engineering approach and found that the cost of pathogen mitigation 
strategies in pork processing were in the scale of $0.03 to $0.2 per carcass of hog. Klein 
and Brester (1997) used econometric analysis to estimate a cost function to evaluate the 
impact of the USDA’s zero-tolerance for fecal contamination in the cost of production. 
From their findings, the cost of the zero tolerance order for meat plants was 
approximately $3 billion with expectations for this to decrease as firms gain economies 
of scope. The estimation approach used to value the benefits and cost of food safety 
regulations seen so far have not taken OB into account and are thus liable to error. There 
is need to estimate the true benefits of food-safety regulations.  
 
Offsetting Behavior and Food-Safety Information 
 
Food is an essential contributor to physical welfare and a main supplier of 
pleasure, worry, and stress (Rozin et al., 1996). Incidents of chemical and bacterial 
contamination of food receive great attention (Foster and Just, 1989). Perceived product 
quality after an adverse event plays an important role in consumer’s consumption 
decision (Swartz and Strand, 1981). Consumer perception plays an integral role in 
valuation of food-safety and nutrition; hence it should be taken into consideration 
whenever such evaluations are to be made. Perceptions and beliefs are formed by 
knowledge, which is a result of exposure to information sources and personal effort in 
getting it (McIntosh et al., 1994). The risk perceived by individuals depends on 
information about the quality and safety of a product that can be gained from a variety of 
sources including among others media coverage, friends and personal experience (Buzby 
and Ready, 1996). A consumer’s risk perception is likely to be unbalanced and short 
lasting, and to vary over time as a result of both positive and negative views (Lui et al., 
1998). Consumers can learn about a particular risk and change their risk perception after 
receiving new information (Smith and Johnson, 1988). Figure 1.2 shows an illustration of 
















Figure 1.2: Change in Perceived Risk with Positive Information after an Unfavorable  
Shock. 
Source: Lui et al. (1998).   
 
 
In figure 1.2, news of a contamination report causes the perceived risk 
p R  to 
move away from the original risk perception. New favorable information helps 
consumers to slowly adjust their risk perception back down to the objective level 
indicated by α. Lichenstein et al. (1978) suggested, from a psychological perspective, 
that the unbalanced emphasis on negative media report relative to positive report could 
lead individuals to overestimate health risk. Trust in risk management institutions may 
play a vital role in shaping consumer’s perception of risk (Wynne, 1980). It is essential 
from an economic stand point, to evaluate the link between the trust consumers place on 
institutions or food suppliers and government/regulators on consumer’s purchasing 
behavior (Bocker and Hanf, 2000). 
 
Onyango et al. (2007), writing after the 2006 nationwide spinach recall, suggested 
that trust in private and public institutions associated with food-safety have considerable 
impact on consumer food-safety perception. This influence is displayed by the public 
trust of those regulatory agencies responsible with food-safety (e.g. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). This trust consumers place on policies presents an avenue for the 
evaluation of OB. OB is implied by reduced concern by consumers in reaction to positive 







Peterson et al. (1995) and Poitras and Sutter (2002) advanced that prior to 
building up a suitable theory on OB, it is essential to make clear certain concerns 
associated with command and control policies, sorting issues which develop due to 
information asymmetry and OB. Direct interventions involve command and control 
principles for implementation which utilize sampling techniques to check a product’s 
quality (Hathaway, 1995). Control interventions directly state actions to be undertaken in 
realizing improved final products; these are widely identified as Good Manufacturing 
Processes (GMPs) (Hathaway, 1995). Poitras and Sutter (2002) claimed that the 
mandatory car safety inspection proved futile because of its command control design. 
They suggested that this design increased consumer costs. To them, the ineffectiveness 
was not due to alteration in consumer’s payoff due to OB.  
 
This study considers the mandatory application of food safety information from 
PR/HACCP that is based on performance standards in the fresh vegetable sector which 
hitherto is non mandatory. Such a move will help evaluate whether consumers become 
lax in reaction to information of the potential impact of implementing such a policy. The 
theoretical model of OB is directly related to that presented by Nganje et al. (2007) where 
the expected accident loss model by Hause (2006) is expanded to incorporate two 
measures. The first measure is OB which, in this case, is represented by consumer’s 
perception of risks. The second measure encompasses consumer behavior regarding safe 
vegetable preparation and consumption. The theoretical model is represented in Equation 
1. 
 
()( ) y y x A π ≡ , L() y  (1) 
 
  The theoretical model above can be decomposed into two components. The first 
component is a production function of expected accident loss which represents the cost of 
illness or death from a foodborne illness. The second component is an objective function 
which describes a potential victim’s tradeoff between utilizing avoidance expenditure, y, 
to reduce the likelihood of getting sick or deciding to purchase other goods. 
 
  () y x A ,  is the cost of illness or death caused by a food borne illness. The level of 
food safety is given by x(in this situation representing the assumption that a performance 
policy standard like PR/HACCP exists in the vegetable sector). y is the monetary 
equivalence of consumer hazard avoidance behavior.  ( ) y π  is the probability of a 
foodborne illness or death occurring, and ( ) x L  represents the monetary equivalent loss to 
the victim should illness or death occur. ( )π π y  and ( ) x L  are assumed to be non-negative, 
strictly decreasing, smooth convex functions defined on [ ] +∞ ∈ , 0 , y x . The consumer’s 
optimal response for all values of x considered is defined as ( ) 0 > x y . An assumption 
that a consumer will choose the optimal hazard avoidance value, y, when given x is also 
made. In such a scenario,x represents expenditure for employing PR/HACCP, which is 
mirrored in an average individual’s perception of risk. The average individual will,  
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therefore, decide on  y (the monetary equivalent of consumer hazard expenditure) given 
the individuals’ perception of risk after x(food safety policy PR/HACCP in this case) has 
been established by policy. This is obtainable because, by assumption,  () 0 ≥ x L . 
Equation 2 represents the behavioral assumption of OB. 
 
() ( ) [] y y x A I C E + − = , , (2) 
 
whereI  is the total income. 
 
  Equation 2 is the second component in the offsetting behavior model expressing 
the behavioral assumption that a consumer decides on avoidance expenditure with the 
aim of maximizing his expected consumption (Hause, 2006). Differentiating equation 2 
in terms of y , we arrive at equation 3. 
 
() ( ) [] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ()()1
,




→ + ↔ x L y
dy
y x L y d
dy
y y x A d
y y x A Min C MaxE π
π   (3)   
 
Equation 2 is differentiated with respect to y to arrive at equation (3). This is the 
case because it is considered that an individual who decides on ( ) y x A ,  and obtaining 
other goods is an average consumer. This individual has only  y at his disposal (monetary 
equivalent of consumer hazard expenditure) and not x(level of food safety regulation in 
this case PR/HACCP). From his or her viewpoint, xis fixed and taken as a constant. Due 
to the fact that we are looking for the maximum of expected consumption ( () C E ) which 
corresponds to minimizing () [] y y x A + , , there is need to equate the first derivative to 
zero. Going from our assumptions, we already know that  ( ) y x A ,  has a minimum and that 
y is non-negative. By implicit differentiation of our first derivative, we get equation (4). 
 









− = ′ → ′ ′ − = ′ ′
x L y
x L y






π π    (4) 
 
Definition 1 
To present a scenario for the existence of OB,x (the food safety regulation) is set 
to be zero (that is no information has been given to consumers); as such  () 0 y y =  and the 
expected accident loss therefore becomes ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 0 L y π . As a result of the adoption of 
PR/HACCP, new information gets into the hands of the consumer, consequently, 
expenditures  0
1 > x (e.g. PR/HACCP application and monitoring expenditures). It 
follows that consumer’s offsetting behavior occurs if equation (5) below is satisfied. 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [] ( )







Food safety policies expenditures x always cause offsetting behavior by 
consumers in the representation of expected hazard loss. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Examining the sign of  y′ from equation (4) leads us to equation 6 
 
() ()














   (6) 
 
As  () x π  and  () y L  by assumption are non-negative, ( ( ) 0 ≥ x L and () 0 ≥ y π ) 
strictly decrease and smooth functions as such ( ( ) 0 < ′ x L and ( ) 0 < y π ) and again 
( () 0 > ′ ′ x L and () 0 > ′ ′ y π . It is expected that the average consumer believes the risk of 
getting sick from food borne disease is reduced because of new safety information from 
the implemented regulation. Individual’s health hazard avoidance expenditure should 
reduce consequently. This is intuitive since  ( ) x y  is a decreasing function of x(having a 
negative slope 0 < ′ y ). This result concurs with the fact that an increase ofxfrom zero to 
1 x  will mean a consequent reduction of  y from  ( ) 0 y  to ( )
1 x y . This implies that with new 
information, the probability of a food safety hazard occurring increases (π will increase 
from  () [] 0 y π  to  ( ) [ ]
1 x y π . The above result is a case of offsetting behavior. 
 
Dominant Offsetting Behavior 
 
Definition 2 
Consumer’s offsetting behavior is dominant if it more than completely offsets the 
reduction in expected health hazard loss from the direct effect of the food safety policy. 
 
Proposition 2  
If an increase inxsignifies dominant offsetting behavior to the consumer, the 
level of food safety regulation x is an inferior factor in improving the health hazard loss 
to consumers as a result of a food borne illness. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Dominant offsetting behavior occurs if the inequality ( ) [ ] () [] 0 , 0 ,
1 1 y A x y x A >  is 
satisfied and in line with definition, a factor of production is inferior if higher output uses 
less of the factor. All elements within the range of function A correspond to a harmful 
(loss) event for individuals and society as a whole. Therefore A − , the negative value 
embodies a gain to individuals and society at large. If a rise in x brings about dominant 
offsetting behavior, xmust be an inferior factor in the production of A − ; more of x 
means less of A − . 
 
To detect the conditions necessary for dominant offsetting behavior, the marginal 
effect of x is divided into the direct effect of x(e.g. the reduction in health hazard loss  
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after the new food safety policy has been implemented) and the indirect offsetting 
behavior of x on y . To do this, we proceed to define the marginal effect of x as follows:  







































































 is the consumer’s marginal offsetting behavior. It evaluates by what proportion  
the direct marginal effect of xon  A is decreased by the victim’s offsetting behavior. If 
the marginal offsetting behavior is greater than 1 for
* 0 x x < < , this means dominant 
offsetting behavior for food safety policy
































is positive, leading to the conclusion that the function 
() () [] x y x A x A , =  will rise for 
* x relative to x ultimately causing dominant offsetting 




















     






 is the reduction of the marginal direct effect of xdue to OB which is 
dependent on  y and notx. 
 
Partial Offsetting Behavior 
 
  Consumer’s OB is partial if it less than absolutely counterbalances the decrease in 
expected health hazard loss from the direct impact of the food safety policy. If the   
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marginal offsetting behavior is less than 1 for * 0 x x < < , this implies partial offsetting 


























1  will be positive. 
Multiplying this expression by  x A  causes the expression to become negative. Showing 







 is negative. The function  () ( ) [] x y x A x A , =  
will decrease for 
* x in comparison tox, resulting in partial offsetting behavior for the 























is positive since 




Consumer’s perception of foodborne risk is affected by locus of control (measures 
undertaken to enhance safety), personal health influence (past experience with a 
foodborne illness), outrage (simply explained as the fear of the unknown), and 
demographic characteristics (e.g., age, income, and education) (Nganje et al., 2005). The 
initial perceived risks of individuals are often unobservable, they can however be 
obtained through survey methods (Smith et al., 1990). A survey based on the factors that 
influence individuals foodborne related risk perception handling, and preparation 
practices was carried out. Factor analysis was used to create risk tolerance indexes for 
each of the factor that influence consumer’s risk perception. Factor analysis is a statistical 
approach that entails compressing information contained in a large number of original 
variables into a smaller set of measurement (factors) with a minimal loss of information 
(Hair et al., 1992). Only those factors that had significant enough contribution were used 
to carry out the empirical analysis. 
 
Two models were used to evaluate the subject’s OB, using the consumer’s 
perception of risk and behavior on safe food handling and consumption preferences as 
proxies for OB. This evaluation was carried out using a discrete choice, Tobit regression. 
Simplified equations for our model are shown on equations 9 and 10: 
 
OB = f (BH, I)   (9) 
 
BH = f (RP),   (10) 
 




Risk Tolerance Index as a Measure of Offsetting Behavior 
 
If consumer’s risk tolerance can be described by their response to a particular  
question, that question can serve as a proxy for actual food-safety risk tolerance  
(Brown et al., 2005). The food-safety risk tolerance measure used is a compound  
measure that blends several variables associated with consumer’s food-safety risk  
perceptions. It is assumed that the value of the indexes is a reflection of consumer’s 
actual food-safety risk tolerance. Compound indexes are suitable in such an evaluation 
given that they overcome measurement errors found in a single variable and characterize 
the various aspects of a concept (Hair et al., 1998).  
 
Risk Tolerance and the Integration of Food-Safety Risk Information 
 
The risk tolerance index is a representation of how individual subject’s perception 
of risk fluctuates. Information plays an important role in this relationship. Consumer’s 
propensity to absorb new information into their risk perception and respond to it could be 
related to their risk tolerance. Empirically, consumer’s objective risk perceptions can 
neither be practically evaluated nor recuperated from consumption activities (Lui et al., 
1998). There is a need to utilize a suitable evaluation method that can capture such a 
hidden trend involving a latent variable like a subject’s perception of risk. The Tobit 
model devised by Tobin (1958) is a suitable model to capture latent variables (e.g., 
change in an individual’s perception in this case). 
 
The Tobit Model 
 
The stochastic model of the Tobit regression and decomposition adopted from 
Greene (2003), Fen and Schmidt (1984) and McDonald and Moffitt (1980) is represented 
in equation 11. 
 
t t t X Y ϖ β + = , if 0 > + t t X ϖ β      (11) 
     0 = t Y ,   if  0 ≤ + t t X ϖ β    V t . ,......... 2 , 1 =  
 
Where V is the number of variables,  t Y  is the dependent variable,  t X  is a vector 
of independent variables, β  is a vector of unknown coefficients, and ϖ  is an 
independently distributed error term which is assumed to be normal with zero mean and 
constant variance
2 σ . The Tobit model assumes that there exists an underlying random 





   A total of 2,583 respondents participated in the experiment. All participants 
involved in the experiment were older than eighteen years of age, and specified that they 
eat fresh vegetables a least three times each week. The experiment involved a cross 
section of ethnic groups. Approximately 68.22% of participants indicated being white,  
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17.89% black, 10.76% being Hispanic, 1.94% Asian, and 1.24% being Native American 
and others who never indicated their race. A matched sample design was utilized to get 
rid of the variation between samples as a source of sampling error. Subjects were asked a 
particular question thrice about their preparation style preference for vegetables and their 
perception of risk at a two-week interval. Three experiments were conducted to elicit 
consumer preference and risk perception. 
 
In the initial experiment, the questionnaire was structured in a manner that no 
specific allusion was made to food safety. The second experiment involved the provision 
of negative food safety information to respondents. The third experiment involved giving 
the respondents positive food-safety information. Positive and negative information given 
to the respondents was obtained from newsletter articles which is an efficient source of 
food-safety information. 
 
Negative Information: The U.S. Centers for Disease Control boosted its estimate of the 
food borne pathogens danger. It is estimated that 5000 people die from food related 
illness. The Most recently publicized outbreaks are the 2003 green onion Hepatitis A and 
the 2006 E. coli O157: H7 and Salmonella nationwide outbreaks (Onyango et al., 2007). 
 
Positive Information: Through advances in food safety, the United States has the safest 
food supply in the world (Agweek-October 28, 2002). 
 
 
Table 1.1: Factor Loadings and Factor Score Coefficients for Loaded Questions. 
Variables  Factor Loadings  Score Coefficients 
Q 16  .744  .634 
Q 17  .752  .580 
Q 19  .500  .403 
Q 28  .644  .476 
Q 31  .547  .436 
*Description of variables can be found in Table A1. 
 
 
Table 1.2: Means and Standard Deviations for Loaded Questions. 
 






































Q  28 3.187  .911  3.199 0.886 3.075 0.888 



















preference (Q 17 )  2.315 0.783 2.299 0.775 2.304  0.784 
Consumer’s 
perception (Q 18)  1.680 0.016 0.693 0.024 1.631  0.025 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA Analysis 
 
  To access if there is any alteration in the subject’s preparation style for the 
variables, the means and variances for perception of risk and preparation style preference 
were calculated. Table 1.3 shows results for the change in mean values for the subject’s 
preparation style preference or convenience and their perception of risk. 
 
  Following from Table 1.3, the mean values of the preparation style preference for 
spinach vary for the three different information stages of the experiment. It decreases 
from 2.315 (when no mention of food safety is made) to 2.299 (as negative information 
on outbreaks and impact of E. coli O157 is provided) then increases slightly to 2.304 
(when positive information from HACCP is made available). The mean value of 
consumer’s perception of risk about the spinach they consume varies significantly with 
the change in information stages. It decreases from 1.680 (with no information) to a low 
of 0.693 (with negative information on outbreaks and the consequences of E. coli O157: 
H7) and then increases considerably to 1.631 (with the provision of positive information 
from PR/HACCP). 
 
  With the change in means of preparation style preference and perception observed 
across information stages observed above, there is a need to statistically test whether the 
changes observed in the subject’s risk tolerance are statistically significant. Two 
hypotheses are tested in line with the data from the three different experiments. The 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) method can help determine if two or more samples have 
the same mean or average. The results of the ANOVA test to statistically analyze the 
change in consumer’s mean perception observed in the different information stages is 
presented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. The null hypothesis advanced in both cases is that the 











Table 1.4: Hypothesis Test Results for the No and Negative Information Stages. 
ANOVA        
Source of 
Variation  SS DF MS F  P-Value  F-Critical 
Between 
Groups    686.628  1  686.628  1176.841  0.000  3.845 
Within 
Groups   1645.33  2820      0.584       
Total  2331.957  2821      
 
  
  Comparing the change in consumer’s mean perception for the no information and 
the negative information stages, the null hypothesis advanced is rejected at the 1% level 
of significance with a p-value of 7.5E-216. In line with the result above, there is therefore 
enough evidence to suggest that no information and the negative information stages of 
the experiment have means that are statistically different from each other. Consumer’s 
perception therefore changes when negative information about the impact of consuming 
spinach contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 is given to them. In a similar manner, we test 
the second null hypothesis that the mean values of negative food safety information from 
the effect of the lethal E. coli O157:H7 and that for positive information from 
PR/HACCP are equal. 
 
 
Table 1.5: Hypothesis Test Results for the Negative and Positive Information Stages. 
ANOVA        
Source of 
Variation  SS DF MS F  P-value  F-Critical 
Between 
Groups    363.046  1  363.046  531.039  0.000  6.648 
Within 
Groups  1361.835  1992      0.684       
Total  1724.881  1993      
 
  
  Comparing the variation in consumer’s mean perception from the negative to the 
positive information stages, the null hypothesis of equality of mean perception was 
rejected at the 1% level of significance with a p-value of 0.000. There is enough evidence 
to suggest that both negative and positive information stages have means that are 
statistically different from each other. This also implies that subjects adjust their 
perception as soon as information on the positive effect of PR/HACCP is given to them. 
  
  The analysis of variance results suggest that consumer’s became less vigilant in 
light of the hazard of E. coli O157:H7 because of their perception that a greater part of 
the threat from pathogens in spinach was mitigated by the implementation of 
PR/HACCP. The above results are in accordance with Onyango et al. (2007) who after 
the 2006 nationwide spinach recalls found that consumers have trust in government  
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actions and engagement with regards to food safety issues. Holistically, these results 
suggest the presence of OB where a food safety policy is enacted to decrease the number 
of possible victim’s contamination from E. coli O157 and other bacteria which cause 
food poisoning. Here OB is shown in the consumer’s lessened care in the face of 
articulated policy. Food safety fears fade away because of policies put in place and as 
such the function played by consumer’s level of alertness in preparation of spinach 
declines while secondary characteristics become their preoccupation.  
 
To evaluate whether the offsetting behavior is dominant or partial, we need 
further analysis for elucidation. To do this two regression models were carried out to test 
the hypothesis that dominant OB may be what is obtainable from the subject’s reaction to 
food safety information. Dominant OB in this light would signify that the marginal effect 
of information concerning the positive HACCP policy impact leads subject’s preparation 
style preference for spinach to rise to at least the level before any information on food 
safety was made available. Marginal benefit analysis will help us deduce whether the OB 
is dominant or partial.  
 
 
Table 1.6: Summary of Tobit Regression Regarding the Offsetting Behavior.   
Variables Coefficients  Marginal  Effect 




Factor 2: Personal Health 
Influence 
  0.031* 
(0.019)   0.029* 
Factor 3: Outrage       -0.049*** 
(0.019)       -0.045*** 
D1        1.682*** 
(0.026)        1.528*** 
D2        1.666*** 
(0.040)        1.514*** 
Sigma        0.974*** 
(0.014) 
 
*** and * denote significance at 1% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Results from Table 1.6 indicate that the dummy variables which represent the two 
information stages D1 and D2 are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. 
This confirms the important role information plays in our evaluation of offsetting 
behavior. Outrage is significant at the 5% level. A reduction in the number of times 
spinach is consumed in a week leads to lowered perception of risk with no information 
and negative food safety information. The personal health influence is significant at 10%. 
This suggests that the higher the age of a consumer, the higher their perception of risk. 
Thus as subjects grow older, they become more cautious about how they prepare and 
consume their vegetables. Increased age will mean a greater risk of getting sick from 
consuming contaminated vegetables, a possible reason why older consumers are more 
careful in the way they prepare and consume their vegetables.  
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Table 1.7: Summary of Tobit Regression Regarding the Change in Information Stage. 
Variable Coefficient  Marginal  Effect 
Factor 2: 
Personal Health Influence 
  0.031* 
(0.019) 
0.029* 





Outrage* Information Stage       -0.034*** 
(0.010) 
    -0.030*** 
D1        1.681*** 
(0.026) 
     1.528*** 
D2        1.665*** 
(0.040) 
      1.514*** 
Sigma        0.973*** 
(0.014) 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
The marginal effect results shown in Table 1.7 indicate that the marginal increase 
in positive food safety information will reduce the likelihood of consuming spinach with 
safe attributes and the frequency of consuming spinach per week by 1.57% and 3.04% 
corresponds with regard to locus of control and outrage. Intuitively, these results indicate 
that positive information affects two of the factors in the risk tolerance that are under the 
control of a consumer (locus of control and outrage) which can lead to dominant OB in 
response to food safety policy. This is obtainable given that the consequence of marginal 
changes in food policy information is a more than balanced variation in consumers’ risk 
perception hence behavior. The above results concur with theoretical results presented by 
Hause (2006), and lend a hand to the fact that various media outlets (e.g., newspapers, 
newsletters, the television and radio) are able to change consumer’s perception of risk 
and hence the outcome of food safety policies on the basis of the information conveyed 


















SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Food-safety policy information from food safety regulations coupled with 
consumer’s food-safety risk tolerance affect consumer’s perception of risk. Construction 
of food safety risk tolerance indexes facilitated the examination of the relationship 
between risk tolerance indexes and the subjects perception of risk. Our findings show the 
presence of OB in the preparation and consumption of vegetables assuming that a 
mandatory policy similar to PR/HACCP is implemented in the vegetable sector. The 
variables under the control of consumers increase the possibility of consuming 
contaminated spinach. Locus of control and outrage will decrease the prospect of 
consumers eating safer spinach by 2.98% and 4.48% respectively. 
 
Hause (2006) stressed that the ultimate effect of policy is an empirical subject. He 
also pointed out that the welfare inference of OB relies mainly on whether the decline in 
victim accident avoidance expenditure is considered a social gain or loss. With this in 
mind, an efficient analysis of the impact of a safety policy on expected accident loss and 
accident rates necessarily needs to consider the potential effects of OB. In perspective of 
the push towards a mandatory policy in the vegetable sector, OB should be taken into 
account before the impact of the regulation can be stated. Failure to do so will lead to 
exaggeration of policy impact and hence mislead consumers further compromising their 
health. OB should be taken into account to enhance the accountability and potential effect 
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Table A1. Survey Questions 
Variable                                                                   
Description 
DEPENDENT VARIBLE 
Q18. How will you rank your perception for safety for spinach products?  1=Safe; 
2=Somewhat safe; 3=Not safe; 4=Other 
 
LOCUS OF CONTROL 
Q16. How do you like your spinach?                                                            1=Fresh bulk; 
2=Fresh prepack; 3=Frozen; 4=Canned 
Q17. What is your preference for convenience?                                           1=Sort; 
2=Wash; 3=Ready to eat;  
Q19. What is the preference for the source of your spinach?                       1= Produced 
locally; 2= Imported from other States;  
                                                                                                                       3=Imported 
from other country 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Q29. Which of the following best describes your ethnicity?                        1=Hispanic; 
2=White; 3=Black/African American 
                                                                                                                       4=Asian; 
5=Indian American/Others 
Q32. What is your highest level of education?                                             1=College 
educated; 2=High school 
 
PERSONAL HEALTH INFLUENCE 
Q28. Please select your age                                                                           1=18-21; 
2=22-34; 3=35-54; 4=55-64. 
Q33. Where do you obtain information about food safety?                          1=Newspaper; 
2=TV; 3=Food labels; 4=I don’t know 
Q35. Has any member of your family ever suffered from severe food 
         Poisoning?                                                                                            1=Yes; 2=No 
 
OUTRAGE 
Q31. How often do you consume spinach per week?                                   1=1-3; 2=4-6; 
3=7 plus 
 
 
 